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KNOCK AND TALK NO MORE 
Jamesa J. Drake* 
The Supreme Court has set out a roadmap for challenging one of the most 
common and insidious police tactics used today: the knock-and-talk.  The path is 
short and clear and it leads to the inescapable conclusion that the knock-and-talk—
as it is actually employed in practice—is unconstitutional. Although the Court has 
yet to squarely consider the issue, some Justices have already taken pains to say, in 
dictum, that knock-and-talks are lawful.1  Practitioners should not be dissuaded.  
What this faction of the Court describes is a highly romanticized–and utterly 
inaccurate–conception of what a knock-and-talk actually entails.2  The sort of 
activity that these members of the Court envision is, unquestionably, constitutional; 
but it is also the exceedingly rare exception to what normally occurs.   
No one doubts that the police may lawfully approach a home, stand at the 
threshold, and knock on the door in order to speak to the occupant.  This is how 
some members of the Court define a knock-and-talk.  But, that is a “false 
generalization” of what a true knock-and-talk involves.3   
In practice, the phrase “knock-and-talk” is a catch-all to explain different 
iterations of police activity, all of which share the same attribute: one or more law 
enforcement officers approach a targeted residence with a predetermined plan to 
circumvent the warrant requirement and convince the homeowner to let them inside 
using tactics designed to undermine, if not completely subjugate, the homeowner’s 
free will.   
For years, criminal defendants have argued to the lower courts that knock-and-
talks coerce the homeowner into consenting to a search.  This approach has had 
little success because voluntariness jurisprudence is notoriously bad.  Now, there is 
another option that bypasses the voluntariness morass altogether.   
Under the Court’s newly revived trespass theory, when the police engage in a 
true knock-and-talk, they violate the Fourth Amendment the moment they breach 
the curtilage with the purpose of obtaining information from within; by the time 
they reach the front door, the die is cast.4  When given, the homeowner’s consent is 
                                                                                                     
 * Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Maine Law School, and counsel of record for the 
defendant in Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2001).  I am grateful to Dmitry Bam, Rory A. 
McNamara and Juliana O'Brien for their helpful comments, and to Elizabeth Tull and Derek Jones for 
their keen editing.  Any errors are my own. 
 1. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1423 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 2. Id. at 1423 (“[P]olice officers do not engage in a search when they . . . engage in a ‘knock and 
talk,’ i.e. knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the purpose of gathering 
evidence.”); Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2001) (“When law enforcement officers who are 
not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do.”). 
 3. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.4. 
 4. Id.; King, 131 S. Ct. at 1858 (“[O]fficers may seek consent-based encounters if they are lawfully 
present in the place where the consensual encounter occurs.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 22, Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 
1561150, at *22. (“This analysis assumes that law enforcement officers have not violated the Fourth 
Amendment by arriving at [their] location . . . . If the police committed a constitutionally proscribed 
trespass or otherwise invaded a protected privacy interest before the dog sniff, even though the dog sniff 
is not a search, the police action would not be valid.”). 
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properly viewed as a non-attenuated fruit of this antecedent Fourth Amendment 
violation, leaving the police with no constitutional foothold to justify any resulting 
search.  
This argument is made possible by the sweeping language in Florida v. 
Jardines.5  In that case, the police breached the curtilage in order to gather probable 
cause evidence.  The police brought a drug-sniffing dog onto the defendant’s front 
porch and used the dog’s “alert” to justify a search warrant.6  The Court held that 
the implicit license that typically permits visitors, including the police, to approach 
the home does not permit them to breach the curtilage in the sole hope of 
discovering incriminating evidence.7  “There is no customary invitation to do that,” 
the Court explained.8  A “search” for Fourth Amendment purposes occurred 
because the officers learned what they learned only by physically intruding on 
constitutionally-protected space: the home’s front doorstep.9 
In a knock-and-talk situation, the police breach the curtilage in order to 
“gather” the homeowner’s consent, evidence that they then use to justify the 
decision to forego a warrant altogether.  The implicit license that permits the police 
to approach the home in order to speak with the occupant does not also permit them 
to target a specific residence and execute a coordinated plan to sidestep the warrant 
requirement using tactics designed to wrest permission from the homeowner to 
come inside.  There is no customary invitation to do that. 
The starting point in the analysis is Kentucky v. King.10  It provides essential 
context to the holding in Jardines.   
I.  KENTUCKY V. KING 
King is billed as a case about police-created exigent circumstances, but it has 
much more interesting things to say about consent. The facts in King bear some 
resemblance to a knock-and-talk: multiple, uniformed officers approached a private 
residence, banged loudly on the door and eventually made their way inside.  But 
the similarities end there. 
In King, three uniformed officers entered the breezeway of an apartment 
complex around 10 o’clock at night in pursuit of a fleeing crack cocaine dealer.11  
They lost sight of the crack dealer, but as chance would have it, they smelled “a 
very strong odor of burnt marijuana” emanating from one of the nearby 
apartments.12  So their focus shifted.13  They “approached the door of that 
apartment.”14  The officers “banged” on the apartment door “‘as loud as [they] 
could’ and announced, ‘[t]his is the police’ or ‘[p]olice, police, police.’”15  The 
                                                                                                     
 5. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 6. Id. at 1413. 
 7. Id. at 1415-16. 
 8. Id. at 1416. 
 9. Id. at 1416-17. 
 10. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011). 
 11. Id. at 1854. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). 
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officers then heard sounds that led them “to believe that drug-related evidence was 
about to be destroyed”; they “announced that they ‘were going to make entry inside 
the apartment’”; and they kicked in the door.16  The Court held that the police did 
not impermissibly create exigent circumstances because they did not engage or 
threaten to engage in conduct that violated the Fourth Amendment,17 and it 
remanded the case to the lower court to decide whether the circumstances were 
truly exigent.18   
In reaching that conclusion, the Court observed that “officers may seek 
consent-based encounters if they are lawfully present in the place where the 
consensual encounter occurs.”19  If consent is freely given, “[i]t makes no 
difference that an officer may have approached the person with the hope or 
expectation of obtaining consent.”20  “When law enforcement officers who are not 
armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen 
might do.”21  Banging loudly on the front door and yelling is “entirely consistent 
with the Fourth Amendment.”22  The Court revisited this thinking in Jardines. 
II.  FLORIDA V. JARDINES 
Soon after King, the Court again considered the constitutionality of law 
enforcement activity on the doorstep of a private residence.  In Jardines, the police 
received an unverified tip that the defendant was growing marijuana inside his 
home and members of a “joint surveillance team” were sent to investigate.23  Two 
officers and a drug-sniffing dog approached the home.24  As the dog approached 
the front porch, he “sensed one of the odors he had been trained to detect” and 
began exploring the area.25  “After sniffing the base of the front door,” the dog 
signaled a positive alert for narcotics.26  “On the basis of what [they] learned at the 
home, [the police] applied for and received a warrant to search the residence.”27   
The case was “straightforward”28 and “easy,”29 the Court said.  Here, the Court 
explained, “there is no doubt” that the officers entered the curtilage of Jardines’ 
home.30  Because “the officers’ investigation took place in a constitutionally 
protected area,” the next question was “whether it was accomplished through an 
unlicensed physical intrusion.”31  Curtilage (unlike the home itself, for example) 
                                                                                                     
 16. Id. (citation omitted). 
 17. Id. at 1858. 
 18. Id. at 1863. 
 19. Id. at 1858 (citation omitted). 
 20. Id.  Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by every member of the Court except Justice Ginsburg.  
Id. at 1853. 
 21. Id. at 1862. 
 22. Id. at 1863. 
 23. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1414.  
 29. Id. at 1417. 
 30. Id. at 1415. 
 31. Id. 
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has a unique attribute: all sorts of people enter it all the time without the 
homeowner’s express consent—“the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters,” for 
example.32  This includes the police, too.  As the Court explained in King and 
reiterated in Jardines, “a police officer not armed with a warrant may approach a 
home and knock, precisely because that is ‘no more than any private citizen might 
do.’”33  And so the issue boiled down to this: “[a]s it is undisputed that the 
detectives . . . [were] firmly planted on the constitutionally protected extension of 
Jardines’ home, the only question is whether he had given his leave (even 
implicitly) for them to do so.”34  The Court held that “[h]e had not.”35  There is no 
“customary invitation” to “engage in canine forensic investigation” around the 
home.36 
The Court’s use of the phrase “canine forensic investigation” is significant: a 
dog sniff is itself not a “search.”37  The dog’s presence was important to the 
analysis because it objectively revealed that the officers’ true purpose was to gather 
evidence in support of a search warrant.  The concurring opinion makes much of 
the fact that a drug-sniffing dog is a “super-sensitive instrument . . . deployed to 
detect things . . . .”38  However, the majority opinion is not so narrowly understood.  
Jardines’s application is not limited to technological aids.  Plenty of other factors 
can evince an officer’s subjective intent to search.   
 III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF “GATHERING EVIDENCE” 
The holding in Jardines is straightforward.  The Court’s reasoning is not.  The 
main difficulty is the apparent circularity of the Court’s logic: the reasonableness of 
a search depends on whether the police had an implied license to enter 
constitutionally-protected space, which in turn depends on the purpose for which 
the police entered, and if the officers’ purpose was to conduct a search, then their 
entry was unreasonable.39   
Other portions of the opinion provide greater clarity.  The Court repeatedly 
says that physically intruding onto the curtilage to “gather information,”40 “trawl 
for evidence,”41 or “gather evidence”42 exceeds any license explicitly or implicitly 
permitted by a homeowner.  The dissenting opinion likewise understands the 
majority’s gravamen to be entry onto the curtilage to “gather evidence” or for 
“discovering information.”43   
                                                                                                     
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 1416 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1862 (2011)). 
 34. Id. at 1415. 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. at 1416. 
 37. Id.; Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 
40 (2000); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).  
 38. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418. 
 39. Id. at 1416-17. 
 40. Id. at 1414-15. 
 41. Id. at 1414. 
 42. Id. at 1416-17. 
 43. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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Without a doubt, this language is “dizzying because of its breadth”44 and there 
is a very real possibility that conduct previously believed to be constitutional is no 
longer.45  The opinion induces a strong, “the Court doesn’t really mean that, right?” 
reaction.  Time will tell whether Jardines’ sweeping language has staying power. 
The core of the opinion, however, is likely to endure.  Importantly, the full 
Court agrees on the legal framework.   
First, the sanctity of the curtilage is a mainstay of Fourth Amendment law.46  
As far as the scope and strength of Fourth Amendment protections are concerned, 
there is no distinction between the home itself and the curtilage surrounding the 
home.47  Jardines reinforces that top to bottom.48   
Lower courts have questioned whether apartment dwellers, who generally do 
not enjoy the exclusive use of common lobbies or hallways, have the same 
curtilage protections as residents of free-standing single-family homes.49  This is 
significant for our purposes because apartments and multi-family units are not 
immune from knock-and-talks.  Here again, practitioners should not be dissuaded.  
The small patch of property immediately in front of the door – e.g. the doorstep; 
where the police must physically stand in order to knock on the door – is 
unambiguously within the ambit of robust Fourth Amendment concern.  As the 
Indiana Court of Appeals has astutely observed: 
Individuals who live in apartments often hang decorations on outside doors and 
place doormats on the ground outside the door.  Further, individuals who have 
apartments that exit immediately outside often place and keep personal items on 
their steps or porches.  Simply because one lives in an apartment does not mean 
that he or she does not at all times occupy the space immediately outside of the 
apartment home.  Thus, one who lives in an apartment also treats the area 
immediately outside his or her apartment home as his or her curtilage.50 
The Jardines majority instructs that “[t]he front porch is the classic exemplar 
of an area adjacent to the home and ‘to which the activity of home life extends.’”51  
The concurring and dissenting opinions agree on that point, too.52 
Second, the full Court acknowledges that Jardines sits on a new, or at least, 
                                                                                                     
 44. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 
2.2(g), at 20 (5th ed. Supp. 2013). 
 45. Id. at § 2.3(c), at 25. 
 46. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300-04 (1987). 
 47. “We . . . regard the area ‘immediately surrounding and associated with the home’—what our 
cases call the curtilage–‘as part of the home itself for Fourth Amendment purposes.’”  Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. at 1414 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)). 
 48. Id. at 1414-15; id. at 1422-23 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 49. See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 2.3(f), at 789 (5th ed. 2012) (“Whether considered from the perspective of the curtilage 
concept or the more modern justified-expectation-of-privacy approach, it is a fair generalization that the 
lands adjoining a multiple-occupancy residence are less likely to receive Fourth Amendment protection 
than the yard of a single-family residence.”). 
 50. Carrie Leonetti, Open Fields in the Inner City: Application of the Curtilage Doctrine to Urban 
and Suburban Areas, 15 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 297, 318 (2007) (quoting Robertson v. State, 740 
N.E.2d 574, 576 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 765 N.E.2d 138 (Ind. 2002)). 
 51. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 182 n.12 (1984)). 
 52. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring); id. at 1421-23 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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newly revived, branch of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Property rights played 
a non-trivial role in the resolution of early Fourth Amendment cases,53 and to the 
surprise of many,54 the Court purported to return to a so-called “trespass theory” in 
United States v. Jones.55  In that case, the Court concluded that the placement of a 
GPS monitor on the undercarriage of a car constituted a “search.”56  It reasoned 
that “when ‘the Government obtains information by physically intruding’” on 
constitutionally protected space, “a ‘search’ has ‘undoubtedly occurred.’”57  We 
now know from Jones that Fourth Amendment protection depends on common-law 
trespass.58  This is “the baseline”59 and this approach is particularly apt when the 
police “‘engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area.’”60 
Jardines is the first post-Jones application of the trespass test, and, not surprisingly, 
the full Court agreed that Katz was not the sole measure of Fourth Amendment 
protection for the home.61 
Third, all of the members of the Court agree that the trespass test hinges on 
“background social norms”62 and “shared social expectations”63 about activity 
within the curtilage.64  This defines the scope of an officer’s implicit license to 
enter.   
All this agreement makes applying Jardines fairly straightforward.  If the 
police were unambiguously within the curtilage, then the only remaining question 
is why they were there. 
A.  The Police May “Approach the Home in Order to Speak With the Occupant” 
Of course, the Court does not unanimously agree about the scope of a 
homeowner’s implicit license to enter the curtilage.65  To that point, the dissenting 
                                                                                                     
 53. Cf. Orin S. Kerr, The Curious History of Fourth Amendment Searches, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 67 
(2012).  Professor Kerr argues that “no trespass test was used in the pre-Katz era.  Neither the original 
understanding nor Supreme Court doctrine equated searches with trespass.  Jones purports to revive a 
test that did not actually exist.”  Id. at 68.  Nonetheless, Professor Kerr notes that “[p]roperty 
traditionally had played a role in Fourth Amendment law, just as it continues to play a role today.”  Id. 
at 87.  “But it was never the exclusive test.”  Id. 
 54. Id. at 68 n.5 (noting the fact that “‘the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been 
added to, not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test’ came as a surprise to every student and 
scholar of the Fourth Amendment.”) (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012)). 
 55. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 56. Id. at 949. 
 57. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414 (quoting Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950 n.3). 
 58. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 59. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 60. Id. (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)) 
(alteration in original). 
 61. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414. 
 62. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion). 
 63. Id. at 1419 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 111 (1978)). 
 64. Id. at 1420-22. 
 65. But even on this point, there is some unanimity.  All of the members of the Court agree that the 
implicit license has spatial (the police may not “veer from the pathway that a visitor would customarily 
use”) and temporal (the police may not “linger”) limitations.  See, e.g., id. at 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
The dissenters even suggest that nighttime entry onto the curtilage exceeds the homeowner’s implicit 
license.  The majority does not engage on this point, but it is likely that they would agree, as well. 
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opinion has a number of interesting things to say about knock-and-talks and 
whether they fall within the implicit license afforded to the police.  On the one 
hand, the dissenters, led by Justice Alito, helpfully observe that by the Court’s 
logic, knock-and-talks fall outside the scope of an implicit license.66  The dissenters 
remark that if entry onto the curtilage to gather evidence constitutes a search, “then 
a standard ‘knock and talk’ and most other police visits would likewise constitute 
searches.”67 “With the exception of visits to serve warrants or civil process,” the 
dissenters observe, “police almost always approach homes with a purpose of 
discovering information.  That is certainly the objective of a ‘knock and talk.’”68  
They lament that “[t]he Court offers no meaningful way of distinguishing the 
‘objective purpose’ of a ‘knock and talk’ from the ‘objective purpose’ of [the 
officers who entered Jardines’s curtilage with a drug dog].”69  The dissenters are 
correct. 
On the other hand, the dissenters in Jardines find this incongruous with King.  
They argue:  
As we recognized in Kentucky v. King, police officers do not engage in a search 
when they approach the front door of a residence and seek to engage in what is 
termed a ‘knock and talk,’ i.e., knocking on the door and seeking to speak to an 
occupant for the purpose of gathering evidence.70 
Again alluding to King, the dissenters add that it does not matter whether “the 
objective of a ‘knock and talk’ is to obtain evidence . . . even damning               
evidence . . . .”71  Still, no Fourth Amendment problem presents.72  The dissenters 
are wrong in this regard.  King is not that broad.     
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia responds: “The dissent argues, citing 
King, that ‘gathering evidence—even damning evidence—is a lawful activity that 
falls within the scope of the license to approach.’  That is a false generalization.”  
He continues:  
What King establishes is that it is not a Fourth Amendment search to approach the 
home in order to speak with the occupant, because all are invited to do that.  The 
mere purpose of discovering information in the course of engaging in that 
permitted conduct does not cause it to violate the Fourth Amendment.73   
The officers in Jardines ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment, Justice Scalia 
reiterates, because “no one is impliedly invited to enter the protected premises of 
the home in order to do nothing but conduct a search.”74   
This exchange leads to an important conclusion.  The entire Court agrees that 
the police may “approach the home in order to speak with the occupant” because 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 67. Id. . 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 1423 (citation omitted). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1416 n.4 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). 
 74. Id. 
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that conduct falls within the implied license.75  This does not mean that the Court 
has sanctioned knock-and-talks.   
B.  Trespass Theory at the Gut Level 
Viewed broadly, Jardines stands for the basic proposition that the police must 
behave in the same manner as any other visitor is expected to behave.76  This gut 
level assessment is likely to strike an appropriate balance and the Court appears to 
encourage this approach.77  This is good.78  Instead of getting bogged down in the 
distinction between approaching the home in order to speak with the occupant 
(permissible), and approaching the home in order to discover information 
(impermissible), it is much easier to simply ask: Would most people find the 
officers’ conduct offensive?  In the case of a knock-and-talk, the answer is a 
resounding: yes!  
With this legal framework in mind, it is now time to examine precisely what a 
knock-and-talk entails.  Because Justice Alito misunderstands the technique, his 
suggestion that “police officers do not engage in a search when they . . . engage in 
what is termed a ‘knock and talk’” is also wrong.79  
Consider the Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court’s definition: “[A] 
knock and talk is used to obtain consent by none too subtle intimidation, which 
further illustrates that it is not simply being used to ask questions at the door as 
anyone might do.”80  He describes the typical knock-and-talk scenario thusly: “Law 
enforcement may arrive either by driving up to the dwelling with multiple cars . . . 
or by stealth, walking through the property to arrive at the door without warning.  
Multiple officers may arrive for the knock and talk.”81  This is far different than 
what Justice Alito envisions.   
IV.  JUSTICE ALITO’S INACCURATE DEFINITION OF A KNOCK-AND-TALK 
 “Knock-and-talk” is a term of art.  Justice Alito’s definition, e.g. “knocking on 
the door and seeking to speak to an occupant for the purpose of gathering 
evidence” which “will lead to the homeowner’s arrest and prosecution,”82 has not 
been endorsed by a majority of the Court, and rightly so.  His definition is 
overbroad—“a false generalization”83—and ultimately, uninformative.  Talking to 
citizens to gather new information is a cartoonish way to describe the act of 
policing, and no one seriously doubts that the act of merely speaking to a 
homeowner is permitted without a warrant.   
                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 1415-16, 1423. 
 76. See supra text accompanying note 32. 
 77. Id. at 1415 (“Complying with the terms of . . . traditional invitation does not require fine-grained 
legal knowledge; it is generally managed by the Nation’s Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters.”). 
 78. Even with electronic research capabilities, there is little chance that overworked trial lawyers 
and judges will plumb the depths of the common law of trespass at the time of the Nation’s founding to 
guide their assessment of the scope of an implicit license. 
 79. Jardines, 113 S. Ct. at 1423. 
 80. Jim Hannah, Forgotten Law and Judicial Duty, 70 ALB. L. REV. 829, 837 (2007). 
 81. Id. at 837. 
 82. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 1416 n.4 (majority opinion). 
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The “[p]olice can, of course, acting in their protective capacity, respond to 
noise complaints, complaints of fights, etc., because these either do not involve 
criminal investigations focused on particular individuals or are justified by exigent 
circumstances.”84   Likewise, the police may “canvass an area following a crime 
seeking out information from householders as to what they may have witnessed, 
since this investigation has not focused on a particular subject and they are not 
going, as far as they know, to his dwelling.”85  And, obviously, “a police officer 
might approach one’s door to sell tickets to a policeman’s ball . . . in the same 
capacity as a salesperson might.”86   
But none of these things resembles a true knock-and-talk, even under the best 
of circumstances.  Certainly it is not what a knock-and-talk means to law 
enforcement.   
It is worth pausing to note that Justice Alito’s misunderstanding of knock-and-
talks might be forgiven.  Jardines was the first time that any member of the Court 
had ever mentioned the term.  Although the phrase appeared in the briefs submitted 
in both King and Jardines, none of the parties or amici in either case seriously 
attempted a definition.87 
At its core, Justice Alito’s definition of a knock-and-talk overlooks all the 
reasons why police departments have so enthusiastically embraced the practice.  
Talking to citizens to gather information is what the police have done for ages.  But 
knock-and-talks are something new and different; and they have caught on like 
wild fire.88 
V.  THE KNOCK-AND-TALK TASK FORCE 
A knock-and-talk is “a technique employed with calculation to the homes of 
people suspected of crimes.”89  Police use this technique “to gain access to a home 
without a search warrant by getting the occupant to consent to entry and search . . . 
. ‘[K]nock and talk might more aptly be named “knock and enter,” because [that] is 
                                                                                                     
 84. Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 1099, 1123 
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usually the officer’s goal.’”90 
There is no shortage of examples of a knock-and-talk in practice.  For 
example, the Dallas Police Department has a “46-member knock-and-talk task 
force.”91  Task force members “rely mostly on neighbors’ tips about unusual 
activity.  Uniformed officers walk up to front doors and ask for permission to go 
inside.  Police record the audio of the conversations to ensure that they have 
explicit consent to enter.”92  In this situation, “[n]iceness is the key.”93   
In Florida, the Orange County Sheriff’s Office has an entire division, Squad 
Five, dedicated to performing knock-and-talks.  This squad conducts an estimated 
300 knock-and-talks each month.94  The commander of Squad Five has refused 
media requests for an interview and has declined to explain precisely what it is that 
his agents do, but a veteran Orlando Police Department drug officer acknowledged 
that with a knock and talk, “you go for broke . . . .”95 
That means sending out three to six plainclothes agents, some of whom may be 
wearing ‘hit gear’: vests or smocks, . . . an I.D. badge dangling from their necks 
and gun belts on their hips.  The effect is twofold: Police want you to be 
intimidated enough to let them in, but they don’t want to pose such a threat that 
suspects clam up.96   
Other similar examples abound. 
Knock-and-talks are not new to the lower courts.97  Their opinions also shed 
light on what the practice actually entails.  For example, in the Ninth Circuit, nine 
law enforcement officers knocked on the door “between three and seven times”; 
after an occupant opened the door, one of the officers explained, “we’re here from 
the DEA” and “we know this house.  There was drug-related activity before.  We 
would like to come in and look around.  Can we come in[?]”98   
In the Fifth Circuit,  
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[A] team of approximately eleven law enforcement officers, from various state and 
federal agencies, arrived to conduct a ‘knock and talk.’  A joint law enforcement 
task force had received reports of narcotics trafficking at the . . . residence, and the 
officers hoped to obtain consent to search the residence . . . . Three officers were 
assigned to secure the perimeter in the back of the house.  Instead of positioning 
themselves outside the property line, however, the officers entered the fenced-in 
backyard through unlocked gates on the right and left sides of the house.99   
In the Tenth Circuit, police officers received a tip about suspected drug activity 
at a particular residence.  “Two of the officers approached the residence to conduct 
a ‘knock-and-talk.’  A woman answered the door.  Officer Adkins introduced 
himself, showed his badge, and asked if he and the other officer could come in.”100  
After “[t]he officer explained the tip,” he asked the homeowner “if the officers 
could search the residence . . . .”101   
VI.  LOWER COURT DEFINITIONS OF A “KNOCK-AND-TALK” 
Not surprisingly, the lower courts, which have a great deal of experience with 
knock-and-talk cases, have defined the phrase differently than Justice Alito.  For 
example, the North Carolina Supreme Court has described a knock-and-talk as a 
“tactic” used by law enforcement when they “don’t have probable cause for a 
search warrant.” 102  Officers “proceed to the residence, knock on the door, and ask 
to be admitted inside.”103   After “gaining entry, the officers inform the person that 
they’re investigating information that drugs are in the house.  The officers then ask 
for permission to search . . . .”104 
The Maryland Court of Appeals describes a knock-and-talk as a “procedure” 
whereby police officers “lacking a warrant or other legal justification for entering 
or searching” a home knock and identify themselves, “request entry in order to ask 
questions concerning unlawful activity in the area, and, upon entry, eventually ask 
permission to search the premises.”105 
So, too, the North Carolina Supreme Court: law enforcement officers 
“approach a residence with the intent to obtain consent to conduct a warrantless 
search and seize contraband”;106 the Iowa Supreme Court: “a ‘knock and talk’ . . . 
involves officers knocking on the door of a house, identifying themselves as 
officers, asking to talk to the occupant about a criminal complaint, and eventually 
requesting permission to search the house”;107 and the Michigan Court of Appeals: 
police “go to a suspect’s residence, engage the individual in a conversation, and 
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attempt to obtain consent to conduct a search.”108  
Other courts have adopted similar definitions.109  The point is, in a knock-and-
talk situation, the police are doing much more than simply approaching the home in 
order to speak with the occupant.   
VII.  WHY KNOCK-AND-TALK? 
In order to better understand why a homeowner would not impliedly consent to 
becoming the subject of a knock-and-talk, it is worth considering why the police 
are so fond of the technique.   
The popularity can first be attributed to the fact that knock-and-talks enable the 
police to enter a home without first establishing any modicum of suspicion—entry 
simply requires the homeowner’s consent—and it has become exceedingly difficult 
for criminal defendants to prevail when the prosecution relies on the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement.110  As one scholar succinctly put it: 
“[c]onsent searches are the black hole into which Fourth Amendment rights are 
swallowed up and disappear.”111  Once inside the home, the police might detect 
incriminating evidence in plain view112 or pursuant to a protective sweep.113   
Another reason might be the fact that, from the perspective of law 
enforcement, consent searches are simply easier and better than searches conducted 
pursuant to a search warrant: there is no administrative hassle, and they often 
enable an open-ended search with virtually no limits because unwitting citizens 
may not understand that they may stop or circumscribe a search already in 
progress.114  It should surprise no one that the police would rather test their powers 
of persuasion on an average citizen than on a neutral and detached magistrate.   
The overwhelming majority of police searches are justified by the consent 
exception to the warrant requirement,115 and it stands to reason that the 
overwhelming majority of “consensual” residential searches are preceded by a 
knock-and-talk.  For example, in Michigan, a knock-and-talk ends in a consensual 
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search eighty to ninety percent of the time.116  Arkansas has a similar eighty percent 
“success” rate.117 
In Independence, Missouri, “[p]olice officers simply walk up to the front door 
of a suspected drug dealer or manufacturer’s residence, inform the occupants they 
have received complaints about drug activity in the house, and ask permission to 
look around.”118  “[R]esidents consent to a search in these circumstances 
approximately 80% of the time . . . it’s like shooting fish,” said one detective, 
bluntly.”119 
It is well beyond the scope of this article to explore why a homeowner might 
surrender her Fourth Amendment protections so readily.120  That is to say, this 
article will not explore whether a knock-and-talk is coercive in the traditional 
sense, e.g., the homeowner’s will to invoke constitutional protections is overborne 
by police conduct.121  Suffice it to say, the argument has been tried.  It fails more 
often than not.   
Scholars have vigorously criticized the Court’s consent-exception 
jurisprudence as out-of-step with the realities of citizen-police encounters, at best, 
and intellectually dishonest, at worst  The Court’s seminal consent case, 
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,122 “was widely criticized when it was announced” and 
the decision is still highly criticized today.123  Happily, the homeowner’s ability to 
refuse entry is irrelevant post-Jardines. 
VIII.  CONSENT AS A NON-ATTENUATED FRUIT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH 
The argument is straightforward.  It relies on the well-worn Wong Sun 
framework.124  First, a defendant must establish an initial illegality, e.g., entry into 
the curtilage in order to gather evidence, which itself constitutes a search.  Then, 
she must demonstrate that her consent is a non-attenuated fruit of that initial 
illegality.   
This latter step is inherently fact specific.  But, in the typical knock-and-talk 
situation, the homeowner’s consent is given very soon after (in close temporal 
proximity) to the officers’ entry onto the curtilage, there are no intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose for which the officers enter is to (flagrantly) 
circumvent the warrant requirement.   
In some jurisdictions, officers engaged in a knock-and-talk are required to give 
a Miranda-like warning to the homeowner, instructing that he or she is free to 
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refuse to consent to search.125  The burden of proving otherwise rests with the 
prosecution.126  Similarly, after King, the police sometimes report smelling the odor 
of marijuana (or, in some cases, precursor substances for the manufacture of 
methamphetamine) once they find themselves standing in front of the door.  This is 
not an intervening event or an event of any Fourth Amendment significance.  The 
fact that the police have discovered potentially incriminating evidence during the 
course of an unlawful entry onto the curtilage does not somehow excuse the initial 
illegality.  A “search is not to be made legal by what it turns up.  In law it is good 
or bad when it starts and does not change character from its success.”127 
Establishing the initial illegality requires proving that the police entered the 
curtilage to gather evidence—the homeowner’s consent—in support of a search.128   
On a gut level, it requires proving that the officers behaved in a way that ordinary 
visitors would not.  Demonstrating that the officers’ decision to seek the 
homeowner’s consent was preordained is helpful.  Evidence that points in that 
direction abounds in the typical knock-and-talk scenario, including: (1) the 
presence of multiple officers—setting aside the issue of whether a show of 
authority evinces intent to induce the homeowner’s acquiescence to an entry or 
full-blown search, more than one officer is not required to obtain consent, but is 
required (and for safety reasons, probably recommended) in order to search an 
entire residence; (2) meetings or discussions in advance of the officers’ arrival at 
the house; (3) the immediacy with which the request to enter or search is made; (4) 
the absence of probable cause—a knock-and-talk serves no investigatory purpose if 
the police can obtain a warrant; if the police can obtain a warrant, then the only 
reason for a knock-and-talk is to avoid the warrant requirement;129 (5) departmental 
data—specifically, the number of consensual residential searches that were 
preceded by an unannounced visit by a team of police officers; and (6) common 
police practice—an entire division devoted to nothing but knock-and-talks, or 
multiple (e.g. hundreds) of knock-and-talks conducted in a months’ time, evince 
more than carefree conversation between a homeowner and the police; as the State 
of Florida acknowledged in its Jardines briefing: “Generally on-duty officers do 
not make house calls to chit-chat.”130 
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Having demonstrated that the officers’ purpose for entering the curtilage is to 
gather evidence, a homeowner need not further prove that she did not impliedly 
license the entry.  Jardines draws a bright line: The police have no license to 
“explore the area around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating 
evidence.”131  The inquiry then moves on to the Brown non-attenuation factors and, 
for practitioners and judges, the analysis should end there. 
IX.  HAS THE JARDINES COURT CORRECTLY IDENTIFIED  
SOCIETAL EXPECTATIONS? 
As an academic exercise, it is worth considering whether the Jardines Court 
was correct.  Is it true that homeowners do not grant an implicit license to the 
police to enter the curtilage for the sole purpose of gathering evidence in support of 
an eventual search?  There is very little to guide the inquiry.  The Court has 
suggested that the answer depends on “widely shared social expectations . . . [that] 
are naturally enough influenced by the law of property, but not controlled by its 
rules.”132  But that is not terribly helpful.  One thing is certain: whether something 
is a widely shared social expectation “cannot reliably be answered solely from the 
comfort of one’s armchair, while reflecting only on one’s own experience.”133 
The Court has suggested that citizens have many reasons to prefer consensual 
searches to searches conducted with a warrant.  One reason is that “[i]f the 
[consensual] search is conducted and proves fruitless, that in itself may convince 
the police that an arrest with its possible stigma and embarrassment is unnecessary, 
or that a far more extensive search pursuant to a warrant is not justified.”134  
Another reason is that “a search pursuant to consent may result in considerably less 
inconvenience for the subject of the search . . . .”135  “In a society based on law,” 
the Court says, “the concept of agreement and consent should be given a weight 
and dignity of its own.”136  All that may be true.  When the choice is between a 
search pursuant to a warrant and a search pursuant to consent, the Court may be 
correct.  But, that is not the choice presented to homeowners in a knock-and-talk 
situation.  When the choice is between a knock-and-talk and being left alone, it is 
safe to presume that citizens would prefer to be left alone.  That comports with 
much of the Court’s jurisprudence in other contexts.137 
It also accords with basic notions of individual liberty.  It is axiomatic that a 
citizen would rather keep to herself—particularly within the sanctity of her home—
than submit to a baseless encounter with a police officer designed only to assuage 
the officer’s hunch that she might be a criminal.  Although it is by no means a 
perfect analogy, perhaps the most infamous modern-day example of the police 
trawling for evidence is New York City’s Stop-and-Frisk Program.138  “On over 2.8 
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million occasions between 2004 and 2009, New York City police officers stopped 
[people and] restrain[ed] their freedom, even if only briefly.”139  Nearly ninety 
percent of the time, the police uncovered no criminal wrongdoing.140  Suffice it to 
say, few of the people subjected to a forced encounter (a “seizure”) with the 
police—even one that ultimately ended without criminal incident—were agnostic 
about their experience.  Rather, they formed a class, “well over one hundred 
thousand” in number, and they sued the City.141  Of course, a homeowner—unlike 
the persons seized in New York City—could simply ignore the police when they 
knock on the door.142  But, it would be utterly illogical to conclude that whether a 
police officer has trespassed into the curtilage depends on the homeowner’s 
presence of mind to ignore him. 
There is also obvious intuitive support for the notion that a homeowner would 
not consent to any of the knock-and-talk scenarios detailed above.  It is safe to 
presume that a homeowner who saw a group of citizens behaving in the manner of 
the officers in those cases would immediately lock the doors, shield the children, 
and—“well, call the police.”143  The dissenting opinion in Jardines minimized the 
significance of the drug-sniffing dog by arguing that “common law allowed even 
unleashed dogs to wander on private property without committing a trespass.”144  
But, there is no common law tradition of knock-and-talks; this law enforcement 
tactic is entirely new, and, to an unsuspecting homeowner, highly disconcerting by 
design. 
Knock-and-talks make a good number of lower courts queasy, too, which 
further suggests that there is no widely shared social custom to permit such activity.  
The Chief Justice of the Arkansas Supreme Court has expressed his unease with 
knock-and-talks, and he paints a very vivid picture of what they truly entail, much 
of which rebuts Justice Alito’s romanticized version of the practice.  He writes: 
“[A]sking questions is often no longer necessarily the primary purpose of a knock 
and talk.  Often it is not one officer, but two or more who approach the door.  Many 
times, the intent in going to a citizen’s door is not to talk but to obtain consent to 
search.”145  He continues by noting that “[l]aw enforcement utilizes the knock and 
talk in lieu of a warrant when they recognize that they do not have probable cause 
or reasonable cause to obtain a search warrant.”146  His conclusion is that “[t]his 
misuse of a knock and talk causes concern that the protections against warrantless 
searches are being eroded.”147  In 2002, the Arkansas Supreme Court agreed with 
him and “declared that its interpretation of the state constitutional provision on 
unlawful search and seizure no longer mirrored the interpretation of the United 
States Supreme Court on the Fourth Amendment” and “[t]his departure came 
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because of the ‘knock and talk.’”148  After Jardines, states will no longer have to 
break with the United States Supreme Court to declare unconstitutional searches 
resulting from knock-and-talks. 
Other courts, which are similarly not known for being overly sympathetic to 
criminal defendants, have also cried foul.  In an opinion that gives detailed account 
of a purported knock-and-talk, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Texas rejected the idea that officers conducting a knock-and-talk simply sought out 
a consensual encounter with the occupants: 
The court does not find credible the testimony that the entry onto Berry’s property 
was merely for the purpose of a permissible ‘knock and talk.’  The court 
determines that the conduct of the officers, who knew they lacked probable cause, 
reflects a plan or effort to arrest Berry without getting a warrant.  The totality of 
the circumstances suggest a major operation.  There were at least eight officers 
present.  The officers carefully planned the operation, staked out their positions 
surrounding Berry’s house, and took cover positions.  Four officers entered 
Berry’s patio and approached the front door.  This is overkill for the stated purpose 
of a “knock and talk.149 
Lower courts, which have the greatest familiarity with the true nature of a 
knock-and-talk should be particularly receptive to the arguments made herein. 
X.  CONCLUSION 
Knock-and-talks are a new law enforcement innovation, specifically designed 
and implemented to circumvent the warrant requirement.  Because no homeowner 
grants an implicit license to the police to enter the curtilage for the sole purpose of 
undermining her constitutional rights, the officers’ presence on the front doorstep 
qualifies as a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.  Any resulting consent will, 
in the mine-run of cases, be the non-attenuated fruit of this initial illegality.  After 
Jardines, it is no longer necessary to argue that the homeowner’s consent was 
coerced; it is enough to demonstrate that the consent was tainted by the officers’ 
unlawful entry onto the curtilage.  Justice Alito’s “false generalization” about what 
a knock-and-talk entails should not dissuade practitioners or lower courts.  The 
police may knock-and-talk no more. 
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